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ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND
SAFETY ACT OF 1969: DO THE ENDS JUSTIFY
THE MEANS?
MICHAEL C. HALLERUD,* VILM L. KOHN,**
AND JOHN T. MEREDITH***

I.

INTRODUCTION

While evidence of the production of coal in North America
extends back nine hundred years or more, formal attention to the
regulation of mining practices to minimize the attendant hazards
is of comparatively recent origin. It was not until 1910 that the
United States Bureau of Mines was established,' culminating efforts to create a national mining authority that began in 1865.2
However, the authority to inspect and investigate in coal mines
was not extended to the Bureau until 1941.1 Finally, in 1952 the
Bureau was empowered for the first time to enforce mandatory
safety standards legislated by Congress.4
In 1969, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act' was
passed by Congress to comprehensively regulate mining practices
*B.A., University of Iowa; J.D., University of Iowa, 1973; Associate, Squire,
Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. Member, Ohio Bar.
**B.A., University of Buffalo, 1948; M.A., University of Buffalo, 1950; Ph.D.,
University of Michigan, 1956; J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1971; Associate, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. Member, Ohio Bar.
***B.A., University of Michigan, 1967; J.D., University of Michigan, 1973;
Associate, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. Member, Ohio Bar.
tThe authors wish to express their grateful appreciation to Thomas H. Barnard, G. Christopher Meyer, and David J. Millstone for their valuable assistance
in the preparation of this article.
I Act of May 16, 1910, ch. 240, § 1, 36 Stat. 369 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1
(1970)).
2 S. 21, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865); see HousE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 91ST
CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLA71VE HISTORY: FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY Acr
(Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Howerton, The

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 16 ROCKY
LAW INSTITUTE 539, 541 (1971).

MOUNTAIN MINERAL

3 Act of May 7, 1941, ch. 87, §§ 1-4, 55 Stat. 177-78 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 4.

451-54 (1970));

Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 877, § 1, 66 Stat. 693-94 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
472-73 (1970)); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 4-6.
1

Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742, repealing 30 U.S.C.

§§ 451-83 (1964), (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970)) [hereinafter referred
to as Act].
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in order "to improve the health and safety conditions of persons
working in the coal mining industry. . .. " This statute, rivaling
even the tax laws in complexity, is one of the most thoroughgoing
and significant pieces of occupational safety and health legislation
ever enacted by any government.'
While a comparison of the 1952 and 1969 enactments will
convince the student that there have been extraordinary extensions in the scope of the practices and conditions coming within
the purview of the regulatory power,8 the enforcement scheme has
remained relatively unchanged on paper.' This is not to say, however, that actual enforcement activity has remained constant. In
fact, the number of inspections and, thus, the number of consequent violation notices and closure orders issued pursuant to federal legislation has dramatically accelerated.'"
The pervasive nature of the regulatory scheme and the sheer
volume of inspections leading to the issuance of violation notices
and closure orders have generated heated controversy among representatives of the industry, the government, and the United Mine
Workers of America." The interface created by production presLEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1.

See Perkins, Forward to HOUSE COMM.ON EDUC. & LABOR, 91ST CONG., 2D
SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH & SAFETY ACT at iii
(Comm. Print 1970). Carl B. Perkins was the Chairman of the House Committee
on Education and Labor during the Ninety-first Congress.
See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

1-3.

Compare the repealed 30 U.S.C. § 473 (1964) with 30 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
10 In 1970, as the enforcement of the Act was being organized by the Bureau of
Mines, there were 10,184 inspections of surface and underground coal mines conducted pursuant to the 1952 and 1969 Acts. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ToWARDS
IMPROVED HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR AMERICA'S COAL MINERS 27-28 (1971). In 1972, the
number of inspections had soared to nearly 60,000 per year. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 2 (1973).
The number of violation notices and closure orders also showed an increase
during this period. In 1970 there were approximately 1,500 closure orders served and
nearly 38,000 violation notices. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, TOWARDS IMPROVED HEALTH
AND SAFETY FOR AMERICA'S COAL MINERS 2-3 (1971). This activity had accelerated
such that during 1972, more than 1,600 closures were ordered and 76,000 violation
notices were issued. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL COAL
MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY

ACT 2 (1973).

11Examples of this friction are many. The 1974 contract negotiations between
the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and the Bituminous Coal Operators
Association (BCOA) featured heated issues of safety as well as economics. See, e.g.,
UNITED MINE WORKERS JOURNAL,

Sept. 1-15, 1974, at 3; id., Oct. 1-16, 1974, at 7.

The UMWA has also been carrying out a concerted campaign to oust the acting
director of the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, James Day. Id.,
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sures in an energy-dependent and profit-dependent economy and
the desperate need to prevent the tragic depletion of what is fashionably termed for political advantage as the industry's "most
valuable resource"-the coal miner himself'-is most often joined
in legal proceedings to review the issuance by federal inspectors of
violation notices and closure orders. 13
This article is an attempt to evaluate some of the legal issues
that have developed in the review of administrative enforcement
activity under section 104 of the Act." Such an inquiry of necessity
must embrace not only the manner in which initial enforcement
discretion is exercised by inspectors of the Mining Enforcement
and Safety Administration (MESA),15 but also, and more importantly, the manner in which the quasi-judicial arm of the Department of Interior" has interpreted and applied, and frequently misinterpreted and misapplied, the enforcement provisons of the Act.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT SCHEME
The basic scheme 7 for enforcing the mandatory safety and
Jan. 16-31, 1975, at 16.
At least one commentator has written extensively on the decrease in production
occasioned by increased enforcement activity. Straton, Survey MeasuresImpact of
the Health and Safety Act on Underground Coal Mining, MINING ENGINEERING,
Oct., 1972, at 64; Straton, Effects of FederalMine Safety Legislationon Production,
Productivity, and Costs, MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, July, 1972, at 19; Straton,
Effects of Safety Legislation on Productivity, MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, August,

1971, at 28. Moreover, since many coal sales contracts provide for price increases
to offset cost increases from the new enactment, litigation and arbitration to determine the amounts of these increases have blossomed. See Straton, Survey Measures, supra at 64-65.

12LEGISLATrvE HISTORY

at 1.

30 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
" 30 U.S.C. § 814(a)-(c) (1970).
'5 The Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) was established by the Secretary of Interior to assume certain functions formerly exercised
by the United States Bureau of Mines, notably the responsibilities imposed by the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the Federal Metal and
Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-40 (1970). 39 Fed. Reg. 23996
(1974).
,1 The Office of Hearings and Appeals. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.500-4.605 (1974).
The Office of Hearings and Appeals includes a Hearings Division through
which applications for review are assigned to individual administrative law judges
for hearing and initial decision. Thereafter, an appeal may be had through the
Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals (IBMA), which serves as the delegate
of the Secretary of Interior for the purpose of reviewing the issuance of notices and
orders and the assessment of civil penalties under the Act.
11This section discusses only the enforcement program established by sections
11

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

health standards and detecting and citing imminent dangers is
found in section 104 of the Act. 8 Section 104 establishes a threetier enforcement pattern differentiated by degrees of danger and
the culpability of the operator in permitting such conditions to
come about. The initial enforcement discretion is entrusted to the
duly authorized representatives of the Secretary of Interior known
commonly as "inspectors." The inspectors may issue notices of
violation and even orders of withdrawal upon the unilateral determination that the appropriate preconditions have been satisfied.
At the top of the hierarchy is the section 104(a) withdrawal
order that the MESA inspector may invoke to order summary
evacuation of personnel and abatement action whenever a condition or practice presenting an imminent danger is discovered."9
This closure is available without regard to the characterization of
the operator's conduct as negligent or otherwise and may be issued
to control conditions or practices that are not violations of mandatory safety standards or that are wholly natural in origin., The
preeminent concern is to save lives and prevent injury by withdrawing personnel from the area of danger and initiating abate21
ment procedures.
Section 104(b) provides for the issuance of a notice of violation
whenever the MESA inspector determines that there has been a
violation of a mandatory health or safety standard which has not
created an imminent danger.22 The notice served upon the operator
must fix a reasonable time period within which the violation must
104(a)-(c) of the Act. There are, however, additional enforcement tools provided.
For instance, when the amount of respirable dust in a working area reaches an
unacceptable level, section 104(i) provides for the issuance of notices and orders to
restore a healthy environment. 30 U.S.C. § 814(i) (1970). Section 104(h) provides
for action by the inspector when unusual conditions arise for which there is no
method of abatement under existing technology. 30 U.S.C. § 814(h) (1970).
There are also provisions in the Act for the exercise of authority to investigate
mine accidents and supervise rescue work. 30 U.S.C. § 813(d)-(f) (1970).

30 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
"

30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970). An imminent danger is defined by the Act as "the

existence of any condition or practice in a coal mine which could reasonably be

expected to cause death or serious physical harm before such condition or practice
can be abated." 30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (1970).

11LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY 89.

Id.; see Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 2 IBMA 128, 141, 1971-1973 CCH
OCCUPAnONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEc.
16,187 at 21,162 (1973) (Doane, A.L.J.,
dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 491 F.2d 277 (1974).
30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (1970).
21
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be corrected. If, at the close of such period, the violation has not
been abated, the inspector must determine whether the time period should be extended or whether an order of withdrawal should
be issued for noncompliance.n The violation notice is based strictly
on the existence of a violation, without regard to the responsibility
of the operator in the bringing about of such condition. The order,
however, is based upon the operator's failure to reasonably effect
compliance once the condition or practice has been cited.
Section 104(c)

4

provides a complicated, three-stage progres-

sion of a notice of violation and closure orders. The notice and
orders available as enforcement tools pursuant to this provision are
based on the violation of a mandatory safety or health standard
which, while not creating an imminent danger, could significantly
and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a mine
safety or health hazard. In addition, the inspector must also evaluate the culpability of the operator in bringing about the cited conditions. When a mandatory standard is found to be violated, the
MESA inspector must issue a section 104(c)(1) notice if he finds
that the cited conditions were caused by the operator's "unwarrantable failure" to comply with the standard and also presented
the requisite level of danger.2
Following the issuance of a notice of violation pursuant to
section 104(c) (1), the operator is effectively placed on a ninety-day
"probation." If another violation of a mandatory standard is found
on the same inspection during which the notice was issued, or
during another inspection within ninety days, the inspector must
issue a section 104(c)(1) withdrawal order if he finds that the new
violation meets the same standards of hazardousness and culpability as are required for issuance of the notice. 2 Thereafter, the
inspector has available the section 104(c)(2) closure order to compel compliance. This order may be issued repeatedly on subsequent inspections if the inspector discovers a violation of a mandatory health and safety standard that is similar to the section
104(c)(1) notice or order by virtue of its hazardousness and the
operator's unwarrantable failure in permitting the violation to
exist. When an inspection of the mine, following the issuance of the
section 104(c) (1) order, discloses no violations similar in danger or
3 Id.
"

30 U.S.C. 1 814(c) (1970).
30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970).

28 Id.
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culpability of the operator to the violation precipitating the section
104(c) order, this progression recycles to the section 104(c)(1) notice stage?
The peremptory closure authority embodied in sections 104(a)
and 104(c) simultaneously represents one of the most salutary
safety mechanisms and the greatest potential for costly and damaging abuse of discretion of any provisions in the Act.
III.

SUMMARY CLOSURE AUTHORITY UNDER
IMMINENT DANGER

SECTION

104(a):

Section 104(a) of the Actn extends to the MESA inspector the
awesome power to order summarily the cessation of mining activity and the evacuation of personnel from all or part of a mine upon
a unilateral determination that an imminent danger exists. The
authority of federal coal mine inspectors to order the withdrawal
of personnel from areas of imminent danger was first provided in
1952,29 and the scope-although not the nature-of the authority
was greatly expanded in the current enactment in 1969.1o The concept of "imminent danger" includes both the seriousness and the
proximity of the hazard. The Act defines an imminent danger as
"the existence of any condition or practice in a coal mine which
could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical
harm before such condition or practice can be abated."'"
The legislative understanding of imminent danger and the
policy behind the closure authority are best demonstrated by the
frequently cited passage from the Senate Report:
The concept of an imminent danger as it has evolved in this
industry is that the situation is so serious that the miners must
be removed from the danger forthwith when the danger is discovered without waiting for any formal proceedings or notice.
The seriousness of the situation demands such immediate action. The first concern is the danger to the miner. Delays, even
of a few minutes, may be criticalor disastrous. After the miners
are free of danger, then the operator can expeditiously appeal
the action of the inspector.2
30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(2) (1970).
30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970).
" Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 877, § 1, 66 Stat. 693-94 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
472(a), 473(a)(.1) (1964)).

11See, e.g., LEGISLATIE HISTORY 45.
3130 U.S.C. § 8020) (1970).
31 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 89 (emphasis added).
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There is virtually no disagreement regarding the reasonableness of providing such authority to MESA inspectors, since safety
and production are interests shared by both management and
labor and are inseparable in the long run. This is not to suggest,
however, that there is not considerable controversy over the actual
exercise of the enforcement discretion that section 104(a) confers.
In balancing the sometimes short-run competition between the
safety of the miners and the peremptory seizure of the operator's
property, the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals (IBMA),
has construed the imminent danger standard as virtually eradicating the temporal factor which is the essence of the power conferred.
The effect of the IBMA's administrative gloss on the imminent
danger standard has been to create a congressionally unanticipated closure power that is similar to that under section 104(c), in
that some general hazard potential must be shown. However, unlike the closure authority provided under section 104(c), the
IBMA's version of section 104(a) is not encumbered with the safeguards Congress designed to prevent random and unchecked utilization of the drastic closure power.
The statutory definition of "imminent danger" clearly provides that the existence of conditions or practices that "could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm" is a
necessary but insufficient condition precedent to the issuance of a
section 104(a) order of withdrawal.m This condition essentially
outlines the degree and probability of the hazards cognizable
under section 104(a). Significantly, this standard is virtually
identical to the threshold danger level in the section 104(c) context: "a probable risk of serious bodily harm or death . . .
13Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 2 IBMA 128, 143, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPA16,187 at 21,163 (1973) (Doane, A.L.J., dissenting),
Carbon Fuel Co., 2 IBMA 42, 49, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. 15,471 at 20,750 (1973).
In CarbonFuel the Bureau of Mines (now MESA) argued in its brief, and the
IBMA so held, that a finding of imminent danger required a two-part determination. First, the existence of a danger of sufficient magnitude and likelihood had to
be assured from the cited conditions or practices. After that threshold consideration
had been satisfied, it had to be determined that the anticipated death or injury
could result before the time required for abatement had elapsed. Brief for Appellee
at 15-16, Carbon Fuel Co., 2 IBMA 42, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC. T 15,471 (1973). See also Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 2 IBMA at
143, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. at 21,162.
" Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 IBMA 331, 349, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706 at 22,602 (1974).
TIONAL HEALTH & SAFETr DEC.
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Thus, the primary distinction between the closures authorized by
sections 104(a) and 104(c) is denoted by the corequisite for the
imminent danger order: the proximity of the hazard to actualization.35
The initial inquiry as to whether the cited conditions meet the
requisite standard of gravity and probability of harm is, of course,
fundamental to evaluation of any situation allegedly presenting an
imminent danger. Naturally there is no formula approach to this
inquiry, since the outcome in each case is dependent upon the
relevant facts. For purposes of the discussion in this article, we
propose to pass over this question of gravity and probability, pausing only to make one observation that seems equally applicable to
the primary focus, namely, the question of imminence itself. We
have noted that virtually without exception, in litigation involving
this issue, the IBMA and administrative law judges have been
readily satisfied that a requisite degree of threatening consequences to life and limb is present. This result is generally reached
by a process of stacking and compounding inferences of cause and
effect, irrespective of the presence or absence of independent, precipitating factors, until the necessary danger is fabricated.
An "imminent" danger, by dictionary definition, is a danger
which is threatening to occur immediately or is at the point of
happening. 6 The urgency implied by the congressional expression
"imminent" is elaborated in the Senate Report by the concern that
"[d]elays, even of a few minutes, may be critical or disastrous.""
There can thus be no question that Congress considered the temporal element to be the sine qua non of the exercise of the section
104(a) withdrawal authority. If the urgency is absent, then action
must be taken, if at all, under sections 104(b) or 104(c). Consequently, in the statutory formulation, "imminent" is defined in
relation to the time period required for abatement action to defuse
the immediate threat of death or serious physical harm. 8
The time required for abatement, therefore, is the practical
measure of the proximity of the danger to actualization. This inter' Of course, there are other important distinctions as well, such as the existence of an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory safety or health
standard.
I Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 2 IBMA 128, 141, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &HEALTH DEC. 16,187 at 21,162 (1973) (Doane, A.L.J., dissenting).
SLEGISLATIVE HISTORY 89.

- 30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (1970).
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pretation was promoted by the Bureau of Mines,39 and was apparently adopted initially by the IBMA in its 1973 decision in Carbon
Fuel Co.4" The IBMA, however, abandoned this position soon
thereafter in EasternAssociated Coal Corp."'There the IBMA held
that
the phrase in the definition [of imminent danger,] "before
such condition or practice can be abated," in no way relates to
the time it may take to abate but relates solely to the condition
of "imminence" of danger. In other words, a condition or practice cannot be imminently dangerous if the specific and usual
mining activity can safely continue in the area during (or prior
to) the abatement process."
The significance of this construction of "imminent" can best
be judged by reference to the facts in EasternAssociated. The cited
danger there resulted from the loosening and projection downward
of two roof bolts into a shuttlecar haulageway, thereby reducing
the vertical clearance in the passage. When the inspector entered
the section, the condition had already been discovered and was
being corrected under the supervision of the section foreman.
There was no danger at that time since the haulageway had been
closed to traffic until proper clearance was restored.43
Despite the voluntary closure of the haulageway removing any
threat of physical danger, the IBMA held that a section 104(a)
closure order was properly issued. The rationale was that normal
operations could not have proceeded in this section without a reasonable likelihood of death or serious physical injury. 4 It is clear,
however, that the order was not issued to evacuate miners from an
impending peril, but to permit the inspector to assume "jurisdiction" over the section. This exercise of control could have been
11See note 33 supra.
402 IBMA 42, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.

15,471

(1973). See also Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 2 IBMA 128, 143, 1971-1973 CCH
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.
16,187 at 21,163 (1973) (Doane, A.L.J.,
dissenting).
" 2 IBMA 128, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. 16,187

(1973), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd.
of Mine Operations Appeals, 491 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1974).
422 IBMA at 143, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. at
21,162 (emphasis added).
,3Id. at 131-33, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. at 21,160-

61.
"

Id. at 135-37, 1971-1973 CCH OCCUPATIONAL

SAF'TY & HEALTH DEC.

at 21,161.

45Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

more properly effectuated, if indeed it were necessary at all, by the
issuance of a notice of violation under section 104(b), providing
that abatement be completed within a reasonable time.
The IBMA's holding in EasternAssociated imposes upon the
imminent danger standard an artifical hypothesis that coal production will continue in all cases. This graft on the statute is
frequently inappropriate, as in EasternAssociated, and serves only
to contrive a presumption of imminence when the reality is otherwise. The net effect is to eliminate the temporal factor, thereby
defeating the congressional mandate that section 104(a) closure
orders be issued only in emergency situations to save lives."
For a danger to be imminent, as a practical matter, all of the
conditions necessary to bring about death or serious physical harm
must be present or likely to develop before abatement eliminates
the threat. If such is not the case, then death or serious physical
harm is not threatening to occur immediately, nor is it at the point
of happening. The fact that corrective action should be initiated
does not require, ipso facto, that such abatement be ordered pursuant to section 104(a).
Soon after its decision in Eastern Associated, the IBMA had
occasion to rule again on the most frequently alleged imminent
danger situation, namely, potential fire or explosion from accumulations of loose coal and coal dust. In Freeman Coal Mining Co.4"
the administrative law judge ruled in his initial decision that an
accumulation of float coal dust along a belt line of 7200 feet did
not create an imminent danger. The judge reasoned that there was
no likelihood of a fire or explosion because there was no source of
ignition present in the affected area. Moreover, the float coal dust
was not in suspension, and methane was absent from the beltway.
The testimony further indicated that the inspector had issued the
imminent danger closure order, not upon his own independent
judgment, but rather, pursuant to "pre-fabricated" guidelines that
an extensive accumulation of float coal dust was automatically
subject to section 104(a). The administrative law judge finally concluded that while there were violations of the mandatory standards, the conditions present or likely to develop did not pose a
reasonable expectation of death or serious injury pending the com89.
2 IBMA 197, 1973-1974 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFY & HEALT DEC. 1 16,567
(1973), affd sub nom. Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations
Appeals, 504 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974).
48

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
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pletion of abatement activity. 8
The IBMA, however, overruled the administrative law judge
and held that an imminent danger did exist. The IBMA felt that
"imminence" was supplied by the fact that eight or nine years
earlier there had been a dust explosion in the mine, that methane
might be released since the mine was classified as gassy under
state law, and that there had been two recent incidents of methane
accumulation. 9 However, none of these conditions could interact
with the float coal dust to create a fire or explosion, especially in
the hour or so that would have been required to inert the combustible float dust."
Freeman, which relied upon the prior holding in Eastern
Associated,"'clearly eliminated the temporal element embodied in
the statutory definition of imminent danger. All that is now required to issue a section 104(a) closure order is an "eminent" danger-one that is very serious, regardless of the likelihood that it will
cause death or serious injury before abatement. This view was
accepted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upon appeal of the Freemandecision. There the court held:
"An imminent threat is one which does not necessarily come to
fruition but the reasonable likelihood that it may, particularly
when the result could well be disastrous, is sufficient to make an
impending threat virtually an immediate one.""2
This astonishing treatment of the congressional standard of
imminent danger indicates a discouraging trend. The court of appeals ruled that the absence of an ignition source only proved that
a fire or explosion "might not have occurred immediately." 3 Yet
from the facts of the case, it could not have occurred at all! Clearly,
Freemanproved only that the existing conditions met the requisite
standard of gravity for a section 104(a) closure order. It was never
shown that the conditions necessary to supply the corequisite of
imminence were present or likely to develop before abatement was
completed.
1' Freeman Coal Mining Co., Docket No. VINC 72-59, at 4-9 (Oct. 19, 1972).
492 IBMA 211-14, 1973-1974 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. at
21,395.
10Freeman Coal Mining Co., Docket No. VINC 72-59, at 5.
" 2 IBMA at 212, 1973-1974 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. at
21,395.
52 Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 504
F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1974).

"Id. at 746.
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This redesign of section 104(a) by the IBMA has, in effect,
created an unauthorized withdrawal order where imminence is not
required. Instead, all that must be shown is the presence of some
conditions that are potentially dangerous when in combination
with other precipitating factors. However, these triggering factors
necessary to create a condition of imminent danger need not be
shown to exist or even be likely to develop."4 Thus, imminent danger has developed a "possible," or "eventual," dimension, instead
of the "probable and immediate" character intended by Congress.
IV. SECTION 104(c): THE PUNITIVE CLOSURE PROVISION
Section 104(c) of the Act,55 as previously noted,5" provides a
complex, progressive series of enforcement measures to deal with
1 Old Ben Coal Corp., 3 IBMA 282, 1973-1974 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC. T 18,297 (1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-1655, 7th Cir., Aug. 14, 1974;
Old Ben Coal Corp., 2 IBMA 271, 1973-1974 CCH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. T 18,227 (1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-1656, 7th Cir., Aug. 14, 1974; Old
Ben Coal Corp., Docket No. VINC 73-96, at 22-23, 27, 47 (Nov. 20, 1974), appeal
docketed, IBMA 75-17, Dec. 4, 1974.
An illustration of the virtual eradication of the elements of immediacy and
probability from the imminent danger standard is provided by the decision in VINC
73-96, supra. There the administrative law judge stated that the IBMA
has construed the Act as prohibiting the accumulation of coal and coal
dust whenever there is a setting from which it can reasonably be concluded that if a fortuitous fire or ignition occurs it can reasonably be
expected to cause death or serious physical harm before the conditions
• . . can be abated ....
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
This application of the imminent danger standard in section 3(j) of the Act is
typical of the recent decisions by the IBMA and administrative law judges. Clearly,
there is a presumption that whatever conditions are required to make the threat to
life and limb immediate may be assumed to exist or likely to occur without any
such actual showing:
Under controlling decisions of the [IBMA] and the courts, accumulations of loose coal, coal dust and float coal dust in a gassy mine with a
bad roof condition together with potentialsources of ignition or fire are
sufficient to constitute an imminent danger, whether or not there is reason to fear an actual ignition or fire.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
The IBMA has characterized situations as imminent when in fact all of the
necessary preconditons for imminence are not in existence or reasonably likely to
occur. This misapplication of the Act, cannot be corrected simply by assuming that
the absent conditions will automatically appear if normal mining operations continue. Thus, the IBMA has read the phrase "before such conditions can be abated"
completely out of the Act.
30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (1970).
58See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
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a limited class of violations of the mandatory safety and health
standards. This section addresses itself to those violations that
could significantly and substantially contribute to a mine safety
or health hazard and are also caused by the operator's "unwarrantable failure" to comply with the standards cited. Because any
action taken pursuant to section 104(c) is conditioned upon the
express disavowal of imminent danger57 and the finding of a degree
of negligence expressed as an unwarrantable failure, it is clear that
closure orders issued pursuant to this section are not taken for
short-run protective purposes, but rather to punish those operators
who are "recalcitrant" in their noncompliance with the mandatory
standards."8
As the section 104(c) closure provisions appear to be becoming
more frequently invoked, increased attention has been focused on
the interpretation of its provisions. While there have not as yet
been any judicial constructions of the section, the IBMA has recently issued a series of decisions that purport to clarify its interpretation and administration of section 104(c). The interpretive
problems arise not only from the complexity of the progression of
notices and orders (the "C series"), but also from the ambiguous
expressions used by Congress to define the nature and degree of the
hazard and the negligent conduct cognizable under the section.
Ironically, the major problem of construction was created by the
IBMA's elaborate interpretation of what appeared to be the only
simple term in section 104(c), an "inspection."
A. The Gravity of the Danger
Section 104(c) provides, as a necessary condition for issuance
of a notice or order, that the violation of a mandatory standard
"significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect
of a mine safety or health hazard."5 The proximity of this danger
to actualization differs materially from that of an imminent danger
under section 104(a), since a significant and substantial danger
might only result in a notice of violation under section 104(c)(1),
although a closure order may be issued depending on the stage of
the 'C series" when the violation is found.
The important consideration, therefore, is the degree of grav30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (1970).

Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 IBMA 331, 351, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706 at 22,602 (1974).
1130 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970).
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ity attendant upon the conditions creating a violation of a mandatory standard. Clearly, any violation of a mandatory standard
must be presumed to create some danger; otherwise, there would
be no need for the regulatory provision. However, for the violation
to be cognizable under section 104(c), this danger must be reasonably grave, or else the words "significant and substantial" would
become mere surplusage. If the requisite danger flowed from the
mere violation of a standard, then a closure could be issued under
sections 104(c) and 104(b), where there is no danger requirement,
on virtually the same basis. This result was clearly not intended
by Congress."
The IBMA has recognized this policy recently in its decision
in EasternAssociated Coal Corporation.' There the IBMA held:
[The] conditions or practices subject to subsection 104(c)
treatment ... are restricted as befits the serious consequences
of employing such strong enforcement tools . . . . Section
104(c) has within its ambit conditions or practices, constituting
violations, which pose a probablerisk of serious bodily harm or
death ....62
Clearly this standard of the danger potential, "a probable risk of
serious bodily harm or death," is virtually indistinguishable from
the degree and probability of danger within the ambit of the section 104(a) "death or serious physical harm."63 This ruling, of
course, does not thereby make the statutory abstraction any less
obscure by simply equating it with another ephemeral concept.
11When a-statutory scheme provides a sequence of enforcement measures
which establishes a gradation in penalties or other consequences, the interpretation
of the statute should recognize and preserve the distinction within the sequence.
Otherwise, the legislative intent to provide a progressive enforcement scheme would
be defeated. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n., 2 Occupational Safety &Health Cases 1283, opinion vacated upon granting of motion for rehearing en banc, id. at 1445 (3d Cir. 1974). There the court
stated:
We believe that a restrictive definition is appropriate here since otherwise there would be no distinction between a "serious" offense and a
"willful" one. The lack of demarcation would permit the agency to assess
a higher penalty than that which is authorized for conduct defined as a
"serious" violation. A broad interpretation of "willful" would disrupt the
gradations of penalties and violations so carefully provided in the Act.
Id. at 1289.
113 IBMA 331, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706
(1974).
62 Id. at 349, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec, at 22,602.
'3 30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (1970). See also 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
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In EasternAssociated the IBMA found that the operator had
disregarded its roof control plan by not installing sufficient posts
in a pillar area. There was no imminent danger because it did not
appear likely that the roof might fall at the moment the closure
was issued. However, there was a probable risk of a roof collapse
because of the lack of props and the history of bad top in this area
of the mine."4 Significantly, the IBMA did not rely exclusively on
the violation itself to support a finding of a probable risk of serious
injury or death, but emphasized additional considerations that
would exacerbate the violation.
That a violation of a mandatory standard alone will generally
not satisfy the gravity requirements of section 104(c) is shown by
the recent IBMA decision of Zeigler Coal Co." There the inspector
noted accumulations of several hundred feet of loose coal and coal
dust ranging in depth up to eighteen inches. In vacating a section
104(c) (1) withdrawal order, the IBMA noted that the inspector had
testified that the cited conditions "did not pose a grave threat to
life and limb .... "66

While these recent interpretations by the IBMA of the "significant and substantial" contribution language in section 104(c) reflect a proper recognition in theory of the high threshold of danger
that must be crossed before the section may be invoked, that does
not mean there will be a proper application in every case. Indeed,
administrative law judges and the IBMA have shown a ready acceptance of an inspector's judgment that the gravity standard has
been met. It is clear, however, that the case-by-case application of
the gravity standard must respect the distinctions in danger levels
imposed by the statutory scheme, thereby confining section 104(c)
to a small class of violations which, but for a lack of imminence,
would be serious enough to be classified as imminent dangers.
B.

Unwarrantable Failure

In addition to a finding that the violation of a mandatory
standard could significantly and substantially contribute to the
cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard, there must be
an additional determination that the violation was caused by an
"1 3 IBMA at 336-37, 354-55, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health
Dec. at 22,600, 22,604.
- 3 IBMA 448, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 19,131
(1974).
11Id. at 461, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,855.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

"unwarrantable failure" of the operator to comply with the standard. 7 An "unwarrantable failure" has been defined by the IBMA
as an intentional or knowing failure to comply with the standard
cited or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of miners."5
There is no indication in the legislative history why Congress
did not express the standard in common law negligence terms, that
would be more readily familiar. The House Conference Report prepared by the managers of the bill recited that an
"unwarrantable failure of the operator to comply" means the
failure of an operator to abate a violation he knew or should
have known existed, or the failure to abate a violation because
of a lack of due diligence, or because of indifference or lack of
reasonable care, on the operator's part."
These varying pronouncements on the meaning of an "unwarrantable failure" have spawned a morass of competing definitions.
The House managers' definition is consistent with a standard of
simple or ordinary negligence. Yet, the IBMA has variously defined the term as a standard of negligence greater than ordinary
negligence, but short of willfulness, and approaching recklessness. By holding that ordinary negligence was not equivalent to an
unwarrantable failure' 7 the IBMA has determined properly that
section 104(c) should not be used where the operator has simply
failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent a violation or abate
one that it knew or should have known existed.7 2 This is again a
recognition that such a strong enforcement tool should not be routinely utilized.3
In Eastern Associated Coal Corp." the IBMA held that the
30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (1970).
" Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 IBMA 331, 356, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706 at 22,604 (1974).
17

6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1030.
70 The meaning of "unwarrantable failure" must be construed as somewhere
short of willfulness or intentional disregard, since such conduct would render an
operator or his agent liable for criminal penalties. 30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1970). To
interpret "unwarrantable" as consistent with willful would defeat the progressive
sanctions of the Act. See authority cited in note 60 supra.
1, 3 IBMA at 349-50, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at
22,602.
72 Compare id. with 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d)(3) (1974).
See 3 IBMA at 349, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at
22,602.
743 IBMA 331, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706
(1974).
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operator had unwarrantably failed to comply with the mandatory
roof support standard. The evidence indicated that the roof control
plan adopted by Eastern had been disregarded in the affected area
for three shifts or more. Since an area where active coal production
is taking place would always have a face foreman present and in
charge, the operator, through its agent, would clearly be aware of
the noncompliance. The history of bad top conditions in the section would impart enough urgency that noncompliance for three
shifts would be more than ordinary negligence.
A contrary result, however, was reached in Freeman CoalMining Co.75 Freeman was cited for accumulations of loose coal and
coal dust for several hundred feet along a shuttle car roadway.
MESA argued that there had been an unwarrantable failure to
comply because Freeman had been warned by MESA that a cyclical clean-up was required as mining progressed, and not only on
idle shifts. Secondly, knowledge of the expected standard of care
was allegedly furnished by issuance of a section 104(b) notice two
days before. Finally, MESA argued that the operator had actual
knowledge of the condition because it was readily observable.76
The IBMA held, however, that there was no unwarrantable
failure to comply.77 First, neither the Act nor the regulations required a clean-up within a specified frequency. It was thus implied
that the duty of care is related to abatement performance measured against the urgency for abatement created by the cited conditions. Because Freeman had a regular and apparently frequent
clean-up program, the IBMA stated that the operator showed a
sustained clean-up effort and a definite regard for the health and
safety of miners.7
Significantly, the IBMA rejected the notion that prior violations indicated that the subject violation was the result of a disregard for safety. A prior history of compliance or noncompliance is
not probative of the conduct of the operator in any subsequent
case. It should also be noted, with a raised eyebrow, that this
argument by MESA runs directly counter to their own published
guidelines that were provided to both inspectors and operators: "It
must be remembered the mere fact that the violation is one that
733 IBMA 434, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 19,177
(1974).
78Id. at 439, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,931.
Id. at 441, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,932.
7' Id. at 440-41, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,932.
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has been observed repeatedly is not reason to assume that this is
unwarrantable failure on the part of operator.""
Finally, the IBMA held in Freeman that the mere fact that the
conditions were readily observable would not "by itself [be] sufficient to support a conclusion of recklessness, that is, a conscious
disregard constituting a gross deviation from the legislated standard of care." 8 Such a pronouncement is dramatic in effect because it establishes that even when the operator has actual knowledge of a violation, the failure to abate will not constitute an unwarrantable failure without an additional showing of recklessness.
Such a showing, presumably, would require proof that the dangers
created by the cited condition were extreme and reasonably proximate, although not imminent.
A corollary to the announced standard in Freeman and
EasternAssociated, which amounts to gross negligence or recklessness, is demonstrated by the case where the operator had neither
actual nor constructive knowledge of the conditions constituting a
violation. Under traditional tort law analysis, which is relevant to
the IBMA's conception of unwarrantable failure, the standard of
care or duty imposed upon the operator is unaffected by his awareness of the violation. However, whether that duty was breached,
that is, whether there was "recklessness" or a "gross deviation"
from the proper standard of care, is intimately related to knowledge of the violation. Thus, when the operator did not know, actually or constructively, of dangerous conditions, there can be no
unwarrantable failure.
This conclusion is unaffected by the fact that the Act places
the primary responsibility for safety upon operators. The Act
clearly does not require the operator to be an insurer of its employees' safety, nor does it impose strict liability. Therefore, the operator is only required to take reasonable precautions to examine for
unsafe conditions. This standard for constructive knowledge is properly viewed as a function of state and federal laws and regulations. For instance, if the applicable laws and regulations require
that a belt line be inspected once per shift by a certified person,
and again during a pre-shift inspection, the operator should be
entitled to rely on the reports of these inspections, since the per"' Letter from John W. Crawford, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior, to all coal mine operators, Nov. 20, 1971.
8 3 IBMA at 442-43, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at
22,932 (emphasis in original).
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sons assigned this duty are invariably certified by state or federal
law."'
A similar situation was recently considered by the IBMA in
Valley Camp Coal Co.8" There the operator sought to have a penalty assessment reduced by contending that it was not negligent
in permitting certain accumulations of loose coal and coal dust to
develop. The operator argued that it had relied on the pre-shift
examination report filed pursuant to West Virginia law, which
showed no violations of state or federal law. The IBMA found that
Valley Camp did not rely on the report but rather on an independent inspection by its foreman. Thus, the operator knew or should
have known of the condition. 3
However, in dictum, the IBMA stated:
We are further in agreement with MESA that even ifthe operator had so relied, it was not the legislative intent to permit him
to exculpate himself of the high degree of care imposed upon
him under the Act by relying upon a report made pursuant to
State law by a person not directly responsible to him. The Act
places primary responsibility for the health and safety of miners
upon the operator.'
Naturally, the operator may not abdicte its responsibilities under
the Act, but a reliance on a state examiner's report is not such an
abdiction, since the examiner is required to report to the operator
in much the same fashion as is the foreman. Valley Camp must
be confined to its own facts. There the operator's foreman was
required to conduct his own examination. Thus, if the operator was
not under a duty to examine a particular area during the time
when the hazardous conditions developed, and the pre-shift reports disclosed no violation, there cannot be any finding of negligence, let alone recklessness, amounting to unwarrantable failure.
In summary, the IBMA has properly defined in theory the
scope and nature of unwarrantable failure. Its decision confines the
availability of section 104(c) to a narrow class of cases where the
operator's conduct is in reckless disregard for safety. Any lower
standard would permit an even more wholesale use of section
104(c) in contravention of congressional intent.
11See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.303-04 (1974).
82 3 IBMA 463, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec.
19,132
(1974).
Id. at 469-70, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,857.
11Id. at 470, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,857.
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C. "An Inspection": The Art of Making "Words Mean So Many
Different Things"
"When I used a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more or less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
said Humpty Dumpty, "[who] is to be
"The question is,"
''
master-that is all."
As demonstrated, section 104(c) of the Act establishes a progression of notices and orders-the "C series." 8 Whether a notice
or order is issued under either sections 104(c) (1) or 104(c) (2) turns
primarily on when, during the series, a violation of a mandatory
safety or health standard is found. For instance, when a violation
of a mandatory health or safety standard is found during an
inspection within ninety days of the issuance of a section 104(c) (1)
notice, a section 104(c)(1) order must be served. Thereafter, and
until there has been an inspection of the mine disclosing no similar
violations, the so-called "clean inspection," a section 104(c)(2)
order will issue."
The "C series" thus threatens the operator with summary
curtailment of his mining operations for repeated or habitual violations of the mandatory safety or health standards. 9 At the same
time, the Act recognizes that there will be occasional violations
even by the conscientious operator and thus does not impose the
severe closure penalty. Instead it permits the continuation of
mining when no violation is discovered during the three-month
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LoOKING GLAss 186 (1906).
See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970). For such an order to issue, of course, there must
also be independent findings by the MESA inspector that the violation was caused
by an unwarrantable failure to comply with the mandatory standard and that the

L.

"

conditions cited were such that they could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard. Id.
30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(2) (1970).
Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 IBMA 331, 358 1974-1975 OCCUPATIONAL
SAFMY & HEALTH DEC. 18,706 (1974); Eastern Associated Coal Corp., Docket No.
HOPE 73-200, at 14 (Feb. 26, 1974); Clinchfield Coal Co., Docket No. NORT 7239, at 17 (Jan. 23, 1974); Clinchfield Coal Co., Docket No. NORT 72-9, at 16 (Jan.
23, 1974).
11See Wheeler & Snow, Proposalsfor AdministrativeAction Under the Federal
Coql Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 3 NAT. RFs. LAW 248, 250 (1970).
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probation period following the issuanance of a section 104(c)(1)
notice or when the mine is brought into compliance after the issuance of a section 104(c)(1) or (c)(2) order.
MESA, however, has interpreted the Act in such a way as to
eliminate and defeat the congressional mandate affording the conscientious operator a measure of consideration not extended to his
more recalcitrant counterpart. This has been accomplished by defining the term "inspection" in such a way that the operator can
be prevented from ever having a "clean inspection" following the
issuance of a section 104(c)(1) order. Thus, the threat of a section
104(c)(2) closure can remain perpetually over the head of the operator. We have seen, for instance, countless cases where a section
104(c)(2) order has been based on a section 104(c)(1) order that
was issued more than one year previous.
The bastardization of the congressional intent in establishing
the "C series" was accomplished by interpreting "an inspection"
of a mine as a series of spot safety and health inspections conducted in rapid succession and covering the entire mine.9 MESA
refers to this as a "complete" or "regular" inspection, " a term and
concept that nowhere appear in the Act. Before there can be a
''clean inspection" which removes the availability of the section
104(c)(2) closure order, MESA argues that there must be a complete or regular inspection, often covering several weeks or months,
during which there must be no violations cited. Because most large
and moderate-sized mines will be inspected almost daily, it is
virtually impossible for an operation, even one making a maximum
effort, to remain totally in compliance over a period of several
weeks. Thus, the section 104(c)(2) order, which was not intended
by Congress to be a routinely issued process, but a severe and
costly lesson to the recalcitrant operator, threatens to become almost commonplace for moderate and large-sized mines.93
"

See authorities cited in note 89 supra; U.S.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR,

MINE SAFETY INSPECTION MANUAL FOR UNDERGROUND MnES

MESA, COAL

§ 1.5 (1971);

Id. (1973).

11See authorities cited in note 91 supra. The concept "regular" or "complete"
inspection is apparently derived from section 103(a) of the Act which requires that
each coal mine be inspected in its entirety at least four times annually. 30 U.S.C.
§ 813(a) (1970).
11From 1970 through 1972, MESA inspectors issued 1,249 withdrawal orders
under sections 104(c)(1) and (c)(2) of the Act alone. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HALTH AND SAFTY ACr, tables A-3 to A-5, at
70-87 (1973); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MOVING FORWARD IN COAL MINE HEALTH AND
SAFETY, table 7, at 65 (1972); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, TOWARDS IMPROVED HEALTH
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MESA has also used its interpretation of "inspection" to effect routine closures of all or part of a mine pursuant to section
104(c)(1). MESA's general inspection program to determine compliance with the mandatory safety standards provides that each
regular inspection be followed by a brief period of random spot
inspections before a new regular inspection is initiated. When a
section 104(c)(1) notice has been issued, a section 104(c)(1) order
must be issued within ninety days or not at all. However, MESA
has advanced the position in at least some cases. 4 that if the
section 104(c)(1) order is issued during a regular inspection, then
such orders may be repeatedly issued during the remainder of the
period before the next regular inspection begins, without regard to
the command of section 104(c)(1) that such orders may only be
issued once and only during a period "within ninety days after the
issuance of [the section 104(c)(1)] notice . . ..., Such an inter-

pretation again has the effect of authorizing closures in nonemergency situations as a routine matter in utter disregard for the
congressional intent.
MESA's interpretation of "inspection," which permits it to
exercise leverage unanticipated and unintended by Congress, is
not only ludicrous on its face and violative of every canon of statutory interpretation and common sense, but it is also violative of
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 was not,
of course, the first congressional attempt to provide safe working
conditions for the American coal miner." The Act replaced the
Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952.11 The enforcement scheme
AND

SAFETY

FOR

AMERICA'S COAL

MINERS,

tables 7-8, at 31-32 (1971). While the

number of such orders seems relatively small, equalling only about two-thirds of
the average number of active underground mines during that period, only a relatively few mines were singled out for such closures. Moreover, the average period
of closure for all orders issued during 1970 was more than eight days. TOWARDS
IMPROVED HEALTH AND SAFETY, supra table

9, at 32.

While the average number of sections 104(c)(1) and (c)(2) orders issued annually from 1970-72 was just over four hundred, there appears to be a marked
accelerating trend. In 1973-74, for which no system-wide data is yet published, there
were seventy sections 104(c)(1) and (c)(2) closure orders issued to one southern
Illinois coal operator alone who operates just three mines.
1,Old Ben Coal Co., Docket Nos. VINC 75-267; VINC 75-269; VINC 75-270;
VINC 75-271; VINC 75-273 (decisions pending).
30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970).
"

See authorities cited in notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.

,7Act of July 16, 1952, 66 Stat. 710 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 451-58 (1970)).
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of the 1952 Act was virtually identical to that of its successor and
clearly furnished the pattern for section 104 of the current Act.
Section 203 of the 1952 Act, as amended,98 the analogue of section
104 of the 1969 Act, provided at subsection (d)(2):
Ifa withdrawal order with respect to any area in a mine has
been issued pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
thereaftera withdrawal order shall promptly be issued by a duly
authorized representative of the Bureau who finds upon any
following inspection the existence in such mine of violations
similar to those that resulted in the issuance of the withdrawal
order under paragraph (1) of this subsection until such time as
an inspection of such mine discloses no similar violations, following an inspection of such mine which discloses no similar
violations, the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall again be applicable to that mine. 9
The only differences between the above-quoted section and
section 104(c) (2) of the 1969 Act are emphasized. The lack of substantive changes demonstrates that Congress obviously intended
to adopt and continue the enforcement mode established by section 203(d)(2), and thus its interpretations, when section 104(c) (2)
was enacted in 1969. This conclusion follows from the fact, among
other things, that the 1952 and 1969 Acts are in pari materia:
statutes dealing with the same subject matter.9 ' The rule of construction applicable in this context is well-defined:
[W]ords or phrases in a provision that were used in a prior
act pertaining to the same subject matter will be construed to
be used in the same sense. It has been said that, "the need for
uniformity becomes more imperative where the same word or
term is used in different statutory sections that are similar in
purpose and content .. .
As in the 1969 Act, Congress in the 1952 Act also authorized
the Director of the Bureau of Mines to conduct inspections to
determine whether there was an imminent danger and whether the
operators were complying with the mine safety standards of the
Act. This authorization, section 202(a) of the 1952 Act, provided
in pertinent part:
9 Act of Mar. 26, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-376, 80 Stat. 84, at 85.
Id. § 3(a) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 473(d)(2) (1970)) (emphasis supplied).
,o'
2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, at 287 (4th
ed. 1973).
"I,
Id. § 51.02, at 290, quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Ridgway, 291 F.2d
257 (3d Cir. 1961). See also Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297 (1896).
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For the purpose of determining whether a danger described
in section 203(a) [imminent danger] exists in any mine . . .
or whether any provision of section 209 [safety standards] is
being violated in any such mine,. . . the Director shall cause
an inspection of each such mine to be made by a duly authorized representative of the Bureau at least annually. The Director shall also make, or cause duly authorized representatives to
make, such special inspections of such mines as may be required by section 203(c) and section 206 .... 102
This statutory authorization of inspections in the 1952 Act was
adopted by the Director nd published as a regulation." 3 Concurrently therewith, the Director published an interpretive regulation
of the term "an inspection" as used in the 1952 Act:
An inspection shall be considered as completed when the
inspector reaches the surface of the mine during or after the
shift on which he first entered the mine. When the inspector
goes in the mine on a shift other than the one on which he came
out of the mine the work he performs on the later shift shall be
considered another inspection.1"'
There can be no doubt that the meaning of the word "inspection"
in the 1952 Act, as it related to enforcement of the imminent danger and safety standard provisions of the Act, was that each separate trip underground was "an inspection." Considering the virtual
identity of section 203(d)(2) of the 1952 Act and section 104(c)(2)
of the 1969 Act, there also can be no doubt that Congress intended
that each trip by an inspector underground to implement the progressive steps of the "C series" would also be an "inspection"
within the meaning of the 1969 Act.
Where a statute has received a contemporaneous and
practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is reenacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight
than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the
correct interpretation of the law . ...
The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature
is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a
statute, especially when made by an administrative body or
executive officers charged with the duty of administering or
enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpre30 U.S.C. § 472(a) (1970).
ID34 Fed. Reg. 1134 (1969) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 45.2 (1970)).
1D 34 Fed. Reg. 1134 (1969) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 45.2-1 (1970)) (emphasis
supplied).
102
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tation upon reenactment. 105

Thus, subsequent to the issuance of any section 104(c) (1) order, if
an inspector goes underground for any authorized purpose and
finds no violations similar to that which precipitated the 104(c) (1)
order, there has been a "clean inspection" which renders inapplicable at that time the provisions of section 104(c)(2).
However, as compelling and dispositive of the issue as the
above historical analysis is, there is an even more cogent reason for
holding that "an inspection" means any separate underground
visit. The interpretive regulation defining "inspection" was in
force and had legal effect for four and one-half years following the

passage of the 1969 Act. While the Secretary of Interior has since
revoked this regulation,"'8 such revocation has instituted without

any authorizing amendments to the Act by Congress. Section
101(j) of the Act' provided for the transition from and the conti-

nuity with the 1952 Act as follows:
All interpretations,regulations,and instructions of the

Secretary or the Director of the Bureau of Mines, in effect on
10 C. SANDS, supra note 100, § 49.09, at 256-57.
The House version of the Act that was presented to the Conference Committee
defined an "inspection" as" . . . the period beginning when an authorized representative of the Secretary first enters a coal mine and ending when he leaves the
coal mine during or after the coal-producing shift in which he entered . .. ."
LEGIsLATIV HISTORY 770. This provision was offered by Rep. Perkins, the chairman
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, as a technical amendment suggested by the Bureau of Mines! Id. 769.
The purpose of this definition is made clear from the House version of the bill.
The House had proposed that following the issuance of what is now a section
104(c) (1) notice, the mine be reinspected to determine if a similar violation existed.
If this reinspection, or an inspection under any other section, discovered a similar
violation, then a section 104(c)(1) order must be issued. H.R. REP. No. 91-563, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1969). Clearly, the House intended a probation period to be
accorded the operator before an order was issued.
However, the Senate version provided for the issuance of a section 104(c)(1)
order during the same or a subsequent inspection. Thus, there was no longer any
need to define when an inspection began or ended, and the definition was eliminated at the House-Senate Conference and in the final bill that passed Congress.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1025.
At no time did Congress discuss or consider a definition or concept of "inspection" different from that quoted above. MESA and the IBMA have created their
"regular" inspection concept from whole cloth.
I Subchapter L of Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which included
section 45.2-1, was revoked by the Secretary of Interior through his deputy assistant, effective July 1, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 23996-97 (1974).
1t 30 U.S.C. § 811(0) (1970).
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the date of enactment of this Act and not inconsistent with any
provisions of this Act, shall be published in the Federal Register
and shall continue in effect until modified or superseded in
accordance with the provisions of this Act."0 8
One of the "interpretations, regulations, and instructions"
effective on the date of the enactment of the 1969 Act was the
above provision defining "an inspection." That provision was republished in the Code of Federal Regulations in 1970,09 and thereafter annually"0 until it was revoked in 1974.' Such publication
and republication in the Code of Federal Regulations satisfies the
requirement of section 101(j) of the Act that those provisions under
the 1952 Act that were consistent with the 1969 Act shall be published in the Federal Register. The Code of Federal Regulations is
a special edition of the Federal Register officially collecting and
codifying those administrative regulations published from time to
time in daily editions of the Federal Register. All items published
in the Federal Register and collected and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations have "general applicability and legal effect,
. * , and are relied upon by the agency as authority for, or are
invoked or used by it in the discharge of, its activities or functions
.... 12 Moreover, federal law requires that such items be judicially noticed."'
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that from
I's
Id. (emphasis supplied).
108 30 C.F.R., subch. L, at 218 (1970).
110Id. at 260 (1971); id. at 223 (1972); id. at 237 (1973).
'" See authorities cited in note 106 supra.
,,Z
44 U.S.C. § 1510 (1970). MESA has contended that the appearance of this
regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations does not constitute publication in the
Federal Register. Old Ben Coal Co., Docket Nos. VINC 74-97 (decision pending).
This is indeed a strange position for a governmental agency to take, but strange or
not, it is without merit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held in Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 172 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.
1949), at the insistence of the Department of the Interior it might be added, that
the required publication of a mineral leasing regulation in the Federal Register was
accomplished by its inclusion in the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 85. Furthermore, the regulation whose publication was therein contested, Circular 1318, Feb.
1, 1934, 54 L.D. 352, was promulgated in 1934, before the daily issues of the Federal
Register were provided for by Congress in the Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. §§
1501 et seq. (1970). Thus, the regulation at issue in Krug, as with 30 C.F.R. § 45.
2-1, never appeared (at a relevant time) in an actual daily issue of the Federal
Register. The publication of these regulations in the Federal Register was effectuated solely by their appearance in the Code of Federal Regulations.
"1 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1970).
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both an analysis of the legislative intent and the clear mandate of
the Secretary of Interior as unambiguously expressed in the Code
of Federal Regulations, a clean "inspection" within the meaning
of section 104(c)(2) of the Act results whenever an authorized representative of the Secretary has occasion to lawfully enter a coal
mine subject to the Act and emerges therefrom without having
cited the operator for a violation similar to the one prompting the
underlying section 104(c)(1) order.
While the foregoing analysis more than adequately demonstrates the proper construction of the term 'an inspection" as used
in section 104(c), a review of the statutory language itself reveals
MESA's tortured and artifical interpretation. The word "an" is
commonly used in connection with a noun beginning with a vowel
to mean "one" or "any." MESA does not examine the entirety of
any reasonably large mine on a single inspection but rather fulfills
the requirements of section 103(a) by a series or group of inspections conducted over a period of days or weeks. This series is, in
no real sense, "one" inspection or "any" inspection. Further, the
words "such mine," when used as in the clause in question, mean
merely the mine to which reference has already been made. They
contain no explicit or implicit reference to the entirety of that
mine. The words of the statute will simply not support this definition as proposed by MESA.
Secondly, the words "an inspection of such mine" should not
be considered in a vacuum."' These words, when considered in the
context of the remainder of section 104 and other related sections
of the Act, clearly indicate the erroneous nature of the definition
followed by MESA. For instance, section 104(c) (1) provides for the
issuance of a section 104(c)(1) order of withdrawal if a violation
similar to that alleged in the prior section 104(c)(1) notice is discovered during "the same inspection of any subsequent inspection
of such mine" within ninety days after issuance of the notice."'
MESA, however, has never contended that these words restrict
section 104(c)(1) such that the issuance of a notice or order under
that section could only occur during a formal series of spot health
and safety inspections intended to cover the entire mine. MESA
inspectors issue notices and orders under section 104(c) (1) without
regard to whether a regular inspection is in progress. In addition,
if MESA's interpretation were to be followed, a section 104(c)(2)
,,4
See authorities cited in notes 101-08 supra and accompanying text.
,, 30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
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order could not be issued until the next "regular inspection" were
begun following the issuance of a section 104(c)(1) order. This
period might range up to several months where section 104(c)(2)
would be inapplicable. Moreover, the interpretation offered by
MESA would prohibit issuance of a section 104(a) order for imminent danger except during a "regular" or "complete" inspection,
since this order may also be issued only "upon any inspection."
MESA has thus defined equivalent language in different fashions dependent merely upon which definition suits its particular
purposes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
capsulized a contrary and certainly more cogent rule of construction when it said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate
of Ridgway:"6
Where a word or phrase is used in different parts of the
same statute, it will be presumed to have the same meaning
throughout. The need for uniformity becomes more imperative
where the same word or term is used in different statutory sections that are similar in purpose and content, or where, as here,
a word is used more than once in the same section."'
The language of section 103(a)"' also demonstrates the appropriate definition for the words "an inspection of such mine." In the
last sentence of that section, the examination of the mine required
at least four times annually is described as an inspection "of the
entire mine.""' When Congress wished to require an inspection of
the complete mine as a condition of liability on the satisfaction of
a statutory duty, it did so in a clear and lucid fashion. MESA is
attempting to read similar language into section 104(c)(2) even
though the language has not been provided by Congress. Had Congress wished to require an inspection of the entire mine as a formal
requirement for the transition from one level of the "C series" to
another, it could have and would have made this intent clear. Its
failure to provide such a qualification should not be rendered
meaningless by allowing MESA to wish these omitted words into
the statute. After all, MESA's authority to administer the Act does
not encompass the power to re-draft it to consolidate or expand its
institutional leverage over the operators.'
"

"

291 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1970).
Id. (emphasis added).
'"

The number of possible examples of why MESA's interpretation of "an

inspection" is erroneous is limited only by the rules of mathmatical probability. For
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The question of what constitutes "an inspection" in the context of the "C series" has been considered numerous times by the
IBMA and individual administrative law judges,' and the IBMA
has adopted MESA's position. An analysis of those decisions
clearly indicates that the results are wholly political, in that there
is no plausible legal basis for the decisions, but only an expressed
concern that the operator will be able to avoid section 104(c)(2)
closure orders unless a longer period of time is permitted in which
to invoke liability. The difficulty with the rationale that operators
should not be able to so easily escape section 104(c)(2) liability is
that Congress did not intend such liability to be routinely invoked.
After all, the fifth amendment forbids seizure of property without
notice and hearing when there is admittedly no emergency or compelling reason requiring such seizure.' 2 Moreover, MESA should
not be permitted to maintain the availability of a section 104(c) (2)
closure order for a year or more by citing an underlying section
104(c)(1) order that is virtually decomposing with age. This is not
a hypothetical situation. It is a common occurrence in large coal
mines. The inspection policies of MESA and the IBMA, we are
convinced, are designed and executed to maintain continuously
the availability of the threat of routine closure orders when no
emergency exists.
V.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCESS:
STACKING THE DECK

Section 105 of the Act'I provides that an operator or representative of the miners affected by a notice of violation or a closure
order may apply for an administrative review of the issuance of the
order pursuant to the hearing procedures established by the regulations.14 This quasi-judicial proceeding is designed to provide a
instance, another perfectly delightful example can be found in section 103(h) of the
Act. 30 U.S.C. § 813(h) (1970). That section provides that an authorized representative of the miners must be given the opportunity to accompany the inspector "on
such inspection." Yet interpreting "inspection" the way MESA proposes causes
some difficulty. To afford the miners' representative to go along on "such
inspection," that is, a series of spot safety and health inspections in rapid succession without interruption that covers the entire mine, some notice must be given
him that this series is beginning. However, section 103(a) specifically provides that
"no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person." 30 U.S.C.
813(a) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
2 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 89 supra.
'" See authorities cited in notes 137-60 infra and accompanying text.
30 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
43 C.F.R. §§ 4.500-4.605 (1974).
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safeguard against abuses of discretion by MESA inspectors,
thereby minimizing the unfair and potentially massive economic
dislocation inherent in wrongfully issued summary closure orders. 15 However, because the review follows the issuance of the
closure order, when the economic damage from a closure order has
already been suffered, the right to an administrative review is, at
best, a long-term measure to ensure the lawful and judicious use
26
of closure orders.
The administrative review proceedings are, of course, important for ensuring that in individual instances the initial exercise
of enforcement discretion by MESA inspectors will properly adhere to the intent of Congress and respect the rights of the operators, the miners, and the public. These proceedings, however, are
even more significant as a vehicle for providing a practical, interpretive framework for the Act, that is, in developing and maintaining, in accordance with congressional guidelines, a reasonable
balance among the sometimes competing interests of the miners,
the operators, and the public. The attainment of this balance,
however, has been repeatedly thwarted by the burden of proof rules
that exempt MESA from having to justify its inspectors' exercises
of discretion. Consequently, the opportunity for an effective review
of administrative action is frequently frustrated, and, with it, the
built-in safeguard to ensure the proper effectuation of the Act and
the protection of the rights of all concerned parties.
The burden of proof in administrative reviews is governed by
regulations of the Secretary of Interior:
In proceedings brought under the Act, the applicant, petitioner or other party initiating the proceedings shall have the
burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence
See Wheeler & Snow, supra note 90, at 250.
,2, As a practical matter, the use of the review proceeding can validly be seen
as a privately financed program by the industry to train and educate mine inspectors in the proper performance of their duties. This was especially true in the first
two years of the Act's operation when the inspection staff was greatly expanded,
virtually overnight. Because the Interior Department had difficulty in recruiting
inspectors, it had to lower its standards and accept what many management personnel considered the least qualified persons in the industry for the position. Time
and again we have seen inspectors who are very much aware of instructions from
their supervisors, but totally ignorant of the applicable regulations. See generally
'"

U.S.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR, TOWARDS IMPROVED HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR AMERICA'S COAL

MINERS § 17-23 (1971); Straton,
MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, Aug.,

Effects of Safety Legislation on Productivity,
1971, at 28.
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provided that. . . wherever the violation of a mandatory health
and safety standard is an issue [MESA) shall have the burden
1
of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 2
Citing this provision as authority, the IBMA has held that when
an imminent danger closure order is issued pursuant to section
104(a), the applicant for administrative review, the operator, must
prove either that there was no danger or that the danger was not
imminent.12 When closure orders are issued pursuant to section
104(c), it would then follow that MESA must establish the threshold question of a violation of a mandatory standard. The operator,
to prevail, must then prove the absence of an unwarrantable failure and that the conditions cited did not present a significant and
129
substantial hazard.
By excusing MESA from preponderating with regard to all or
most elements necessary to sustain a withdrawal order, the regulation has, without congressional authorization, created rebuttable
presumptions of the propriety of the inspector's actions. Consequently, the regulation has converted certain ordinary defenses,
arising from the facts upon which the closure order is based, into
affirmative defenses that the applicant/operator must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence. As a practical matter,
therefore, the inspector is accorded more leverage because the government need not be prepared to justify his exercises of discretion.
The abuses of discretion thus engendered by thwarting an effective
review of an order are many and significant.
While as a matter of policy the burden of proof should be
assigned to MESA as to all elements of an order, the objections to
the regulation, section 4.587, do not stop there. Section 4.587 was
promulgated in direct violation of the Act and thus is ultra vires.
Section 105(a) of the Act provides that administrative review
proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to the hearing provisions
'- 43 C.F.R. § 4.587 (1974).

I' See, e.g., Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 2 IBMA 197, 208, 1973-1974 CCH
& HEALTH DEC. 16,567 at 21,394 (1973).
"' However, things are not always what they seem. While administrative law
judges have regularly been assigning the burden of proof to the applicant as to all
issues except the violation of a mandatory standard, the IBMA has been chary of
making so bold an assertion, undoubtedly because of the assertion by operators that
this burden of proqf regulation is invalid. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3
IBMA 331, 341-42, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706 at
22,604 (1974), and authorities cited in notes 132-35 infra and accompanying text.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
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of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 3° Section 556(d) of
the APA provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute, the proponent of the rule or order has the burden of
3
proof.", ,
In three cases presently consolidated on appeal and pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
as Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Board of Mine Operations
Appeals,'12 the government has maintained that section 105(a)
"specifically" invokes the exception clause of section 556(d) and
provides that the burden of proof be borne by the operator in an
administrative review proceeding.'33 This argument is alchemized
from the language in section 105(a) that permits both the operator
and the representative of the miners "to present information relating to the issuance and continuance of such order"'34 when either
applies for a review of the closure order. If extension of this opportunity carries with it the burden of proof, then both the operator
and the miners' representative must prove their positions by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, since the interests of
these parties in review proceedings seldom, if ever, coincide,
MESA's suggested construction of section 105(a) would require the
two parties to establish mutually exclusive conclusions by a preponderance of the evidence.
The remainder of MESA's argument in Old Ben Coal as to
why the operator must bear the burden of proof involves essentially
the proposition that if MESA must prove its inspectors acted in
accordance with the law, then mining will become more dangerous,
and enforcement of the Act will be frustrated.'35 This argument
breaks down of its own weight. Section 4.587, which assigns the
burden of proof, provides the MESA must prove violations of man'" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970). Section 105 of the Act states that review hearings shall be subject to section 554 of the APA which, in turn, provides that the

actual conduct of the hearing be governed by section 556 of the APA. The IBMA
has recognized the general applicability of section 556 to hearings under the Act.
Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 2 IBMA 197, 205, 1973-1974 CCH OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. 16,567 at 21,393 (1973).
131 5 U.S.C. 1 556(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
"I Appeal Nos. 74-1654, 74-1655, 74-1656 (7th Cir., filed August 14, 1974).
"3 Brief for Respondents at 28, Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd, of Mine
Operations Appeals, id.
'u 30 U.S.C. § 815 (a)(1) (1970).
'1 Brief for Respondents at 28-31, Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, supra note 132.
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datory standards in review proceedings for closure orders issued
pursuant to sections 104(b) and 104(c). If the relationship between
section 4.587 of the regulations and section 105(a) of the Act is such
that safety requires that the operator disprove an imminent danger, one might well ask why it is less dangerous to require that
MESA preponderate when the conditions only create a "significant and substantial" danger.
Of course, section 105(a) only provides the right to a hearing;
it does not purport, expressly or impliedly, to assign the burden of
proof. There is no discussion of an intention to assign the burden
to the applicant anywhere in the legislative history. Had Congress
intended to allocate the burden of proof at variance with the assignment made by section 556(d) of the APA, it would have done
so explicitly. For example, the provisions of the Act relating to
eligibility for pneumonoconiosis (black lung) benefits expressly
alter the APA burden of proof standards by creating statutory
presumptions.'36 MESA, in effect, has attempted to create presumptions concerning the validity of closure orders through section
105(a) when Congress has otherwise decreed.
This reassignment of the burden of proof by administrative
fiat has worked an untold hardship on operators challenging
abuses of enforcement discretion. It has virtually become a presumption behind which MESA can hide when an unjustifiable
order has been issued. There is no question in the minds of those
active in challenging improper withdrawal orders that the quality
of enforcement performance would be very much different if the
burden of proof were assigned where it belongs-upon MESA.
VI.

THE CONsTrrUTINAL DIMENSIONS OF CLOSURE ORDERS

The area of inquiry that has received the least attention is the
constitutionality of the Act's enforcement provisions.137 Because
closure orders under section 104 may be issued statutorily without
prior notice or hearing, the question arises whether coal operators
are being deprived of a property interest without due process of law
under the fifth amendment to the Constitution.'1
30 U.S.C. 1 921(c) (1970).
There currently are three cases consolidated on appeal before the Seventh
Circuit charging that section 104(a) of the Act is unconstitutional as applied. Old
Ben Coal Corp., Appeal Nos. 74-1654, 74-1655, 74-1656 (7th Cir., filed Aug. 14,
13

1974).
"I The Constitution provides that "no person shall

..
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Although extensive regulation of a business at substantial
expense to its owner is commonplace and no longer raises serious
constitutional questions, the summary administrative closure of a
business or a seizure of property held for sale is recognized as a
deprivation of a property interest that must be attended by sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.'39 The extent of the procedural safeguards and
the stage at which they must be afforded depends upon the urgency " ° of administrative action, the relative importance of the
interest protected by closure or seizure, and the property interest
impaired."'
Summary deprivations of liberty or property are, of course,
not per se invalid. The United States Supreme Court enunciated
ground rules for such seizures in the landmark consumer case,
42
Fuentes v.Shevin:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary
to secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"' North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). See generally
U.S. v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021
(1970) (the right to pursue a lawful business is a "property right" subject to fifth
amendment protection); Freedman, Summary Action by AdministrativeAgencies,
40 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1972).

"0 Urgency relates to the proposition "that the legitimate interest of the party
opposing the hearing might be defeated outright if such hearing were to be held."
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 188 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Examples of decisions approving summary administrative ac.
tion because of such urgency include Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974) (sequestration of property held subject to a debt when the possessor of the
property could waste it); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (appointment of
conservator of assets of a savings and loan association to prevent otherwise irreparable economic harm to the community); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (seizure of property as security for collection of a tax when property otherwise
might be wasted); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)
(spoiled food that otherwise would have been sold on the market). See generally
Freedman, supra note 139, at 1-20.
"' Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155, 188 (1974).
In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the
Supreme Court stated: "[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may
require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of
the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action." Id. at 895.
,2407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and
justified in the particular instance.'

However, even where summary seizures have been held constitutionally permissible, the property owner must be afforded a hearing before the deprivation becomes final. Moreover, there are generally provisions for full compensation for any property loss if the
deprivation is subsequently determined to be wrongful.1 " For example, in North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,15 the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago ordinance that permitted the seizure and destruction of allegedly tainted food without prior notice
and hearing. The reasoning of the Court and the authorities cited
in support of its decision make it very clear that the public interest
ih emergency situations outweighs the general right of prior notice
and hearing. However, the right to a subsequent hearing may not
be infringed by statute nor may the right of the property owner to
the actions by the inspectors are proved to have
recover his loss, if
1 5
been unjustified.

The imminent danger closure provision in section 104(a) of the
Act fits squarely within the well-established doctrine permitting
summary governmental action when emergencies threaten health
or safety. However, because such seizure without hearing may only
be authorized under a narrowly drawn statute"7 and must be subsequently compensated if the deprivation is found to be unjustified,' it is clear that the validity of the section 104(a) closure
authority must rest upon a narrow construction of the provision
that confines its application to truly emergency conditions. As the
earlier analysis of section 104(a) has demonstrated, 4' the provision
is unquestionably valid on its face for the power it confers. However, the construction of "imminent" by the IBMA has removed
the congressional and constitutional constraints that such summary closure be invoked only in true emergencies when delay could
be fatal.
Id. at 91.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Ewing v. Mattinger & Casselberry
Co., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950). See generally Freedman, supra note 139; Note,
Changing Concepts of Consumer Due Process in the Supreme Court-The New
Conservative Majority Bids Farewell to Fuentes, 60 IowA L. REv. 262 (1974).
145211 U.S. 306 (1908).
211 U.S. at 315-21.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
See 211 U.S. at 315-21.
", See authorities cited in notes 28-54 supra and accompanying text.
",
',
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Sections 104(b) and 104(c) authorize closure under conditions
where there is an express disavowal of an imminent danger. The
section 104(b) closure order is issued to compel more rapid compliance with the mandatory safety and health standards."' Closure
orders issued pursuant to section 104(c) are also characterized by
the absence of an emergency. Moreover, the closure is provided
solely to punish recalcitrant operators whose history of compliance
involves an element of reckless disregard for safety."' While compelling compliance with safety and health standards is indeed a
matter of serious public concern, the lack of urgency on a case-bycase basis undermines the validity of summary closure as a proper
means. Clearly, the long-run inlerest in forcing compliance can be
equally well served by the imposition of monetary penalties following full hearing. Such an approach would provide miners with
effective protection of their interest in safety without prejudicing
the constitutional rights of the operators.
The Supreme Court has ruled that governmental action that
is less restrictive of constitutional rights must be employed when
there is no emergency justifying summary action. In Bell v.
Burson,"' the Court held that "it is fundamental that except in
emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires
that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here
involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing'...
before the termination becomes effective.""' Thus, it is clear that
sections 104(b) and 104(c) are constitutionally deficient in that
they authorize a summary taking of property without prior notice
or hearing.
Perhaps in recognition of this constitutional principle requiring prior hearing, Congress sought to provide limited avenues of
temporary relief for the operator affected by an order issued pursuant to sections 104(b) or 104(c). There is no such opportunity for
temporary relief afforded the recipient of a section 104(a) closure
order for imminent danger.'54 Section 105(d) of the Act authorizes
the Secretary to grant temporary relief from orders issued pursuant
to sections 104(b) or 104(c) if the operator files a written request
accompanied by a "detailed statement giving reasons for granting
'5 See authorities cited in notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
"' See authorities cited in notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
152 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
' Id. at 542.
25

30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1970).
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such relief' and if the evidence presented at the hearing so invoked
establishes that there is "substantial likelihood" that the decision
of the Secretary of the Interior will be favorable to the applicant.
Moreover, the operator must show that temporary relief "will not
adversely affect the health and safety of miners in the coal
mine." 5'
This temporary relief provision is ineffective to cure the deprivation that has been caused by a summary closure. The closure
immediately curtails production, thereby preventing the operator
from generating income from property valuable only for that purpose. Moreover, this "relief" is more illusory than real, since the
average closure order will have been terminated before the relief
can be obtained." 6
The availability of temporary relief from a section 104(b) closure order was recently considered by a three-judge district court
panel in Lucas v. Morton.'57 The court held that the provision for
temporary relief afforded the operator sufficient due process, even
though the initial effects of a section 104(b) closure order might be
unavoidable. The operator had contended that a section 104(b)
notice was unreviewable and that no temporary relief was permitted. Thus, a closure order could be issued under section 104(b)
before the hearing on the violation itself was held. The court reasoned that if a written appeal were filed pursuant to section 105(d),
the Secretary of the Interior could modify or terminate the closure
order pending the required hearing. 5 ' This possibility of temporary
relief before issuance of a section 104(b) closure order, which is
theoretical at best, was the basis upon which the court upheld the
validity of the section 104(b) order.
The significance of the Lucas decision is that the constitutional requirement of an opportunity for hearing prior to nonemergency closure was recognized. The Lucas court emphasized that it
would not have been able to uphold the constitutionality of the
section 104(b) closure provisions without the availability of tempo'Id.
'
In 1970, the average closure order was in effect only a few days, and many
were effective for only a few days. This short period, during which the loss in gross
realization from curtailed production can still be great, would not be enough time
to reasonably or effectively invoke the relief powers of the Secretary. See TOWARDS
IMPROVED HEALTH AND SAFETY, supra note 10, at 32.
57 358 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1973).

M5'
Id. at 904.
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rary relief pursuant to section 105(d) and the Secretary's power to
modify the order pending section 105(d) proceedings.", Indeed, the
construction of section 105(d), accepted by the court in Lucas, is
not at all obvious from the face of the Act, and the court unambiguously stated that it adopted this analysis solely because it was
the only way that the statute could be reconciled with constitutional requirements.' 60 Significantly, the closure provisions of
section 104(c) could not withstand a constitutional attack, even
with the artificial and generous interpretation of the Act offered in
Lucas.
More important, however, is the question of what relief is to
be afforded the operator whose property is wrongfully seized by
MESA inspectors who issue invalid withdrawal orders. The Act
makes no provision for compensation, thus requiring the operator
to bear the burden of MESA's improper exercise of enforcement
discretion. The courts may eventually hold that this economic
onus is an unavoidable incident of modern regulation. Such a ruling would leave the operator in a position of having to pass these
costs of regulation on to consumers as best as it can. This, however,
may prove in time to be an improvident approach as substitutes
for coal, such as nuclear and solar energy, become more available
and competitive. At that point, the costs cannot be effectively
passed on, and the regulatory burden will be fatal to the industry. 6' Only proper enforcement or compensation can prevent the
Act from eliminating its own reason for existence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is one
of the most significant pieces of social legislation in our time in
that it was intended to dramatically improve the safety and health
conditions of thousands of American coal miners. However, in the
passion and emotion that precipitated its formulation and enactment, Congress lost sight of the elementary concepts of fairness to
the regulated party, the coal mine operator, by conferring drastic
economic leverage on front-line bureaucrats with little or no conception of the impact the bureaucratic decisions would have on
constitutional rights.
Id.
,00Id. at 904-05.
"

See Wheeler & Snow, supra note 90, at 250.
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6.61

The impact of the improper design of the enforcement provisions of the Act has been compounded by the generally questionable construction and application by the IBMA. Only when some
short-term balance is restored to the interests of safety and production will the Act properly safeguard the right of miners to a safe
and healthy working environment, while protecting the rights of
the operators to fair and equitable regulation of their business in
the interest of all members of the public.
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